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We investigate the impact of home country institutions on the skill 
level of immigrants to the United States over 1988-1998. 
Specifically, we explore the hypothesis that institutions are 
multidimensional and that the different dimensions have 
conflicting impacts on the migration of skilled labor. Using an 
exploratory factor analysis on fifteen institutional variables, we 
identify the following dimensions of institutional character: 
credibility; transparency; democracy; and the security of civil 
society. We find that credibility and transparency increase the 
magnitude of brain drain; security reduces it; and democracy has 
no significant impact. 
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1. Introduction 
The migration of tertiary skilled labor or brain drain has come to be a central theme in 
the ongoing debate on globalization, and the last decade and a half has seen the emergence of a 
significant literature on the causes and consequences of the phenomenon, especially the latter. 
This paper investigates the impact of political institutions in the countries of origin on the skill 
levels of legal immigrants to the United States over the period 1988 to 1998. We emphasize the 
multidimensionality of political institutions and provide evidence that the various aspects of 
institutional structure have differing impacts on the migration of skilled labor from a country. 
Thus, the credibility and transparency of governance both increase the magnitude of brain drain; 
political stability reduces it; and democracy has no significant impact. 
This paper bears on three distinct areas of inquiry. First, in looking at institutional 
determinants of skilled migration, it contributes to the literature that investigates the causes and 
consequences of brain drain. Given that the magnitude of brain drain has serious consequences 
for economies affected by the phenomenon, it also contributes to the more general literature that 
investigates the influence of institutions in determining the economic prospects of a nation. 
Lastly, it contributes to the literature that looks at the impact of sociopolitical instability on 
economic performance. 
The onset of globalization has seen a rejuvenation of interest in the causes and 
consequences of brain drain (Commander et al. [2004]). Key determinants of the magnitude of 
the brain drain include the factors proposed in the more general literature on the selection of 
immigrants; namely, the wage differential between the source and the destination countries; 
poverty, inequality, and demographic structure in the source country; and dimensions of cultural 
similarity and geographical proximity between the source and the destination countries (Borjas 
[1994], Hatton and Williamson [2005]). To this list, this paper adds the institutional structure in   3
the country or origin, with the cautionary note that the different dimensions of institutional 
character differ in their impacts on the incentive to migrate. 
There is a lack of consensus regarding the consequences of brain drain. Early studies 
argue that brain drain is detrimental for the economic development of a nation affected by it 
(Bhagwati and Rodriguez [1975], for example).
1 However, an emerging literature contends that 
brain drain is typically accompanied by a brain gain for the country of origin for several reasons. 
First, migration prospects raise the expected returns to investing in human capital in the country 
of origin (Beine et al. [2008a]). Further, highly skilled immigrant networks facilitate foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Kugler and Rapoport [2007]) and the diffusion of technology to the 
countries of origin (Lodigiani [2008]). In addition, skilled diasporas contribute towards the 
adoption of institutional reforms in the home country (Li and McHale [2006]).
2 This  paper 
contributes to the debate by pointing out the need for a more nuanced assessment of the 
consequences of brain drain: The magnitude of brain drain and, hence, its impact on the source 
country depends critically on the institutional structure in the source country; and different 
aspects of institutional structure have differing impacts on the migration of skilled labor. 
A contribution closely related to our own is Beine et al. (2008b), who find that the 
adverse consequences of brain drain are particularly acute for small states. Interestingly, however, 
they find no robust relationship between political instability in the source country and the extent 
of skilled migration, even though it does it does impact the total migration rate. Our results, 
                                                 
1See Fan and Stark (2007b) and Docquier and Rapoport (2007) for contemporary articulations of this position. 
2  Fan and Stark (2007a) attempts to synthesize the conflicting positions. While brain drain may indeed be 
detrimental in the short run, it may yield long term benefits if accompanied by a relaxation of migration policy.   4
based on a wider sample of countries; a longer sample period; explicit panel data analysis; and a 
finer conception of institutional structure, appear to indicate the reverse.
3 
The literature on institutional determinants of economic development comprises a distinct 
field of study and it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt any review of the existing state 
of research. Referring the reader to a survey such as Lin and Nugent (1995) for an idea of the 
classic contributions, we provide a brief idea of the literature that investigates the consequences 
of political instability on economic outcomes, particularly economic growth.  
A major impetus for the study of the economic consequences of institutional quality and 
political instability has been provided by studies that investigated the growth tragedy of Africa 
(Easterly and Levine [1997]) and the growth collapse of economies in South America or the 
Middle East from the seventies (Rodrik [1999]); and attributes these phenomena to social 
conflict engendered along one or more faultline in society. From this, a more general literature 
has emerged that investigates the effect of inequality on economic growth via its role in fostering 
conflict.  Benabou (1996) identifies two types of studies in this area: The first constructs indices 
of sociopolitical instability using data on social unrest (Alesina and Perotti [1996], Perotti [1996], 
Sala-i-Martin [1997]); while the second uses indices of insecure property rights (Knack and 
Keefer [2002]). A contribution of our study is to point out that the two types of indicators used in 
the previous literature may in fact have differing impacts on certain economic outcomes; in our 
case, the migration of skilled labor.  
Given the correlation between available institutional variables, most existing studies on 
the institutional determinants of economic outcomes either include the variables separately in 
regressions (Easterly and Levine [1997]) or construct unidimensional indices of institutional 
                                                 
3 Beine, et al (2008) focus on emigration rates for the years 1990 and 2000 in a sample of 46 developing countries 
with a population of less than 1.5 million. Their study is based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of 
Kaufman, et al. (2003).  Unfortunately, these indicators are not available for the period we are interested in.   5
structure from the available indicators (Alesina and Perotti [1996], Perotti [1996]). The first 
method is limited by the fact that the estimates may fail to capture the full impact of an 
institutional variable due to omitted variable bias, whereas the second ignores the argument that 
institutions may have multiple dimensions. Highlighting this, recent study by Langbein and 
Knack (2010) undertakes a confirmatory factor analysis for the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) to determine if these six measures are causally related to single latent variable 
good governance and are unable to confirm this hypothesis. Notably, Ghate, et al. (2003) and 
Jong-A-Pin (2009) explicitly account for the multidimensionality of political instability and 
document differing impacts of the various dimensions on the rate of growth. While 
methodologically similar to Jong-A-Pin (2009), our study embraces a more general idea of 
institutional structure, of which stability is one aspect.  
Combining these areas of the literature, we investigate the separate impacts of 
institutional quality and institutional stability on the magnitude of the brain drain. By 
institutional quality, we refer to the efficiency and transparency of the organs of governance, 
such as the quality of bureaucracy, extent of corruption, and so on. Institutional stability, on the 
other hand, refers to factors that constitute threats to the continuity of the political environment, 
such as conflict. We explore the hypothesis that these different aspects of institutional structure 
have conflicting impacts on the educational attainment of immigrants.  
In trying to distinguish between the quality and stability aspects of institutional structure, 
we are constrained by the fact that any prior classification of available institutional variables into 
indicators of quality and stability is innately problematic. Take, for example, the variable called 
durability of a regime, provided by the ICRG dataset: This variable purports to capture the 
stability of political institutions as measured by the years since the last change in government. 
However, a regime may be durable precisely because it ensures a high quality of public   6
institutions. Without further investigation, it is therefore difficult to classify the durability 
variable as an unambiguous measure of stability. Indeed, as we show in Section 4, there is reason 
to believe that it really captures the ability of the government to deliver a high quality of public 
services, and hence enjoy a greater perception of legitimacy.  
In view of such problems, we perform an exploratory factor analysis on fifteen 
institutional variables commonly used in the literature. This allows us to identify the following 
aspects of institutional character: (1) credibility of the government; (2) transparency of 
government operations; (3) democracy; and (4) security of civil society. Of these, the first three 
are taken to stand for the quality of existing institutions, while the last is taken to capture the 
stability dimension. In line with the hypotheses laid out in the next section, high institutional 
quality, as captured by the credibility and transparency of government, is seen to increase the 
educational attainment of immigrants to the United States over the sample period, while high 
stability is seen to reduce it. Interestingly, democracy does not have a robust impact.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section describes our variables and data 
sources. Section 3 presents a preliminary exploration of our data and underlines the need for a 
more nuanced analysis of institutional variables, such as the one conducted in this paper. Section 
4 reports the results of our exploratory factor analysis; and Section 5 uses the principal factors 
identified in the previous section to conduct a more rigorous analysis of the data. This section 
presents and interprets our major findings and performs a number of robustness checks on our 
results. Section 6 concludes the paper by providing a brief summary of our analysis and 
indicating directions for further research. 
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2. Empirical Model and Description of Data 
We explore the hypothesis that the two characteristics of political institutions in a country, 
namely quality and stability, may have conflicting impacts on the educational attainment of 
migrants. Political instability reduces the expected future returns to educational investment. 
Hence, an individual who has invested in education will have a greater incentive to migrate if the 
political climate is unstable than if it is stable. The quality of political institutions may, however, 
impact the selection of migrants differently. To appreciate this, consider a pair of countries with 
a given differential in institutional quality. If this differential is large, then the marginal benefit 
of migration from the country with poor institutions is large across the skill distribution. Hence, 
both skilled and unskilled workers have an incentive to migrate. By contrast, if the country of 
origin has a relatively high quality of political institutions, the marginal benefit from migration is 
relatively lower. Thus, for a given cost of migrating, highly skilled workers have a greater 
incentive to migrate. This analysis leads to the following hypotheses: 
1.  Immigrants from countries with greater political stability tend to be less skilled on the 
average than immigrants from countries with more stable governments; 
2.  Immigrants from countries with higher institutional quality will tend to be more skilled 
than immigrants from countries with lower institutional quality.  
We test the impact of institutions on the brain drain using data on immigrants to the 
United States over the period 1988-1998. The choice of this period allows us to avoid structural 
changes due to the two major immigration legislations in the United States, namely the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (ICRA) of 1986 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, which was not implemented until 1998. We 
employ the following fixed effects model to test our hypotheses:   8
it i it it it u Z X Y        2 1  
The dependent variable  it Y  represents the skill intensity of immigrants from country i in year t;  
it X is the vector of controls (including information about the immigrants from each country of 
origin, its GDP, and educational attainment of its population);  it Z   is the vector of indices 
capturing the quality and stability of governance respectively;  i u  is the fixed effect error term; 
and  it   is the idiosyncratic error. 
Given the relationship between the institutional structure of an economy and per capita 
GDP reported by the vast literature on institutional determinants of economic prosperity (Mauro 
[1995], Alesina and Perotti [1996], Perotti [1996], Knack and Keefer [1995]), our preliminary 
investigation of the data implements a two stage procedure to account for endogeneity. First, we 
estimate per capita GDP using per capita energy consumption in the source countries and the 
other explanatory variables as instruments. Then, we estimate the fixed effects model in (1) with 
skill intensity as dependent variable and the predicted value of per capita GDP.
4 
Measuring the Education of New Immigrants 
Data on new immigrants to the United States over the sample period 1988-1998 come 
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The Immigrants Admitted to the United 
States Series reports the following characteristics for each immigrant: year of admission; visa 
class; countries of birth, last residence, and quota chargeability; age; occupation; marital status; 
gender; intended state and city of residence in the United States; labor certification status; and 
                                                 
4We obtain the same results when per capita GDP is included directly as a control variable.   9
whether the particular case constitutes new admission or an adjustment in visa status for a non-
immigrant foreign national already in the United States.
5  
One problem with the INS dataset is that it does not report the educational attainment of 
immigrants directly, so we must consider an alternative measure of skill for our dependent 
variable. To do this, we construct a discrete measure of skill for each immigrant skill based on 
their occupation. Then, we measure the skill intensity of immigrants from each country as the 
proportion of immigrants who are seeking employment in high-skill occupations. We briefly 
outline this technique below.  
Our methodology for calculating the skill intensity of the immigrants from each country 
is a three-step process based on methodologies proposed by Topel (1994) and Polgreen and 
Simpson (2006). First, following Polgreen and Simpson (2006), we construct a predicted 
measure of educational attainment, based primarily on occupation, but also taking into account 
other demographic characteristics available from the INS dataset. Using data on the US 
population from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Polgreen and Simpson (2006) estimate 
the following equation for each occupation, k: 
jk jk k jk k jk k k jk married gender age d e           3 2 1 0 ˆ
. 
The estimates of this equation are then used to obtain the predicted years of education of 
immigrants in each occupation k, based on the demographic characteristics reported in the INS 
dataset. While this measure of education may not be precise as a cardinal measure of education, 
it gives a sufficiently precise ordinal ranking of immigrants' skills based on their occupation, 
which is all we need to be able to construct our skill variable. Second, following Topel (1994), 
the predicted measure of educational attainment  jk d e ˆ  is averaged for each occupation k to obtain 
                                                 
5  The complete dataset covers the period 1972 – 2000 and is available at the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) website. See Polgreen and Simpson (2006) for a detailed description.   10
an ordinal ranking of the skill required for each occupation. Then, and also following Topel 
(1994), immigrants are identified as highly-skilled if their occupation falls in the top tertile of 
occupations; they are identified as semi-skilled if their occupation falls in the middle tertile; and 
they are identified as unskilled if their occupation falls in the bottom tertile. Finally, we calculate 
skill intensity for each country in each year as the fraction of all immigrants from that country 
whose occupations were identified as highly-skilled. 
It should be mentioned that the predicted measure of immigrant education proposed by 
Polgreen and Simpson (2006) has its limitations. First, the predicted variable only captures the 
occupational skills for immigrants who report an occupation, which excludes children, retirees, 
students, homemakers, the unemployed, or immigrants who have not reported an occupation. 
However, they document that numbers of immigrants from these categories have been relatively 
stable over the period in question, so any bias introduced by their omission is also stable. Second, 
immigrants are less likely to be matched into their primary occupation than natives due to 
licensing and other barriers to entry, as documented by Chiswick and Miller (2008). However, 
while such mismatching may indeed affect the wages of immigrants after they arrive, it does not 
necessarily affect their educational attainment when they decided to leave. Last, constructed 
variables such as our measure of immigrant education may be subject to measurement error. 
However, this is less of a problem for us, since we are primarily concerned with the ordinal 
ranking of skill based on occupation. Still, we address this issue by using a bootstrap method to 
calculate the standard errors of our coefficients.
6  
Despite the caveats outlined above, we feel that the INS dataset is of greater use for the 
purpose of this study than the existing alternatives, which include the Current Population Survey 
                                                 
6 We replicated our bootstrap 100 times using stratified random sampling, where the strata were defined as the 
different countries of origin. This way, we also address the problem of heteroskedasticity across different countries' 
immigrants.    11
(CPS) and the Census of Foreign-Born Population from the U.S. Census Bureau; the New 
Immigrant Survey (NIS); and the OECD immigration databases compiled by Docquier and 
Marfouk (2006) and Brucker and Defoort (2006), among others. Although using these data may 
help to overcome some of the methodological problems described above, these datasets are based 
on total stocks of immigrants at a point in time rather than the flows of immigrants in a given 
year. For this reason, they do not provide information about the characteristics of immigrants at 
the time of their migration and do not answer our basic question of how the institutional structure 
of a country influences the skill composition of migrants from that country in that year. A second 
problem with these alternatives is that they include undocumented immigrants, whose selection 
may be influenced by factors other than what we are interested in. For example, it is plausible 
that illegal immigrants may be selected from the lower tail of the skill distribution because low 
skilled workers have less to lose from being detected and barred legal entry for life.  
Controls and Institutional Variables 
The first set of controls comes from the INS Series and includes (1) the proportion of 
"new entrant" visas awarded to immigrants from each country; (2) the proportion of a country's 
immigrants belonging to each of five broad visa classes; (3) the total number of immigrants from 
each country of origin; (4) year; and (5) region. The new entrant variable helps control for the 
fact that many high-skilled immigrants who eventually receive work visas have already entered 
under a temporary "non-immigrant" student visa. The proportions of immigrants belonging to 
each visa class control for how binding the quota restrictions are.
7 In particular, family members 
of US permanent residents and refugees are not counted in the same in the quota allocation for 
their home country (and, as we find later, they have lower skill levels on average).  
                                                 
7 Classification 29.   12
The second set of controls used in our model consists of source country characteristics. 
For each country, we consider (6) the population of the country in each year and (7) the per 
capita GDP in each year from the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank; 
and (8) the average years of education in the country in each year of the sample period from 
Barro and Lee (2001). We also include (9) the average years of education in the country in 1960 
in order to distinguish between the effect of historical levels of educational attainment in a 
country and the effect of current changes in educational attainment. As shown in Table 2, the 
sample mean of the population variable (6) taken over all countries and all years in the sample is 
approximately 45.2 million people. Given the discrepancy in sizes of the countries in our sample, 
the standard deviation is rather large at about 115 million and ranges between 0.7 and 982 
million. The mean of GDP per capita, is $7,513, has a standard deviation of $9,047, and ranges 
between $100 and 36,800. Lastly, the mean of the education variable over the entire sample 
period is approximately 6.2 years, has a standard deviation of 2.6 years, and ranges between 1.2 
and 11.8 years.  
Information on institutional characteristics comes from the Polity IV project provided by 
the Center for Systematic Peace, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the 
Political Risk Services (PRS) Group, and the Database of Political Institutions compiled by Beck 
et al. (2001) and published by the World Bank. The Polity IV database provides 30 variables 
relating to the extent of democratization and durability of the political system in a wide sample 
of countries.
8 Of these variables, we select the (13) Polity IV Index, which aims to quantify the 
extent to which a country's system is democratic as opposed to autocratic, based on the openness 
and competitiveness of executive recruitment; constraints on the executive; and the regulation 
                                                 
8 A complete description of the variables and methodology for the Polity database can be found at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2007.pdf.    13
and competitiveness of participation in the government.
9 We also consider the variable called 
(14) Regime Durability, which is calculated as the number of years since the last regime change. 
In the context of our hypotheses, democracy is interpreted as a measure of institutional quality 
and regime durability is interpreted as a measure of institutional stability. 
The ICRG dataset provides information on 22 variables relating to political, financial and 
economic risk in 161 countries of the world from 1980 to the present.
10 We include the following 
indices from the ICRG data as measures of institutional quality: (15) the corruption index, which 
seeks to assess the lack of corruption within the political system; (16) the index of bureaucratic 
quality, which  captures the extent of autonomy and expertise of the bureaucracy; (17) the 
investment profile index, which captures the viability of contractual agreements, repatriation of 
profits, and delays in payments receivable; (18) the democratic accountability index, which 
measures the responsiveness of the government to the people.
11  
Four other variables from the ICRG dataset appear to capture institutional stability and 
are included in our analysis: (19) the government stability index, which uses information on unity 
within the government, legislative strength, and the level of popular support to assess "the 
government’s ability to carry out its declared programs and its ability to stay in office"; (20) the 
index of internal conflict, constructed based on the absence of civil wars, coups, terrorism, other 
forms of political violence, and civil disorder;
12 (21)  the  index of external conflict, which 
assesses the extent to which a country is free from "risk to the incumbent government from 
                                                 
9 The index itself ranges from -10 for countries that are very autocratic to +10 for countries that are very democratic. 
10 See http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx for a complete description of the ICRG variables and the 
methodology used to construct them.  
11 While indices (13) – (15) employ a scale of 0-6; (16) and (17) employ a scale of 0-4 to assess the relevant 
dimension of institutional quality. Countries receiving higher scores are ones with stronger institutions (i.e. low 
levels of corruption or conflict); countries receiving lower scores have weaker institutions.  
12 There are other measures of political instability, such as the one constructed by Alesina and Perotti (1996) for 
example. Most of these measures are highly correlated with each other. See Jong-A-Pin (2009) for a detailed 
discussion of the different measures of political instability used in the economic literature.    14
foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure … to violent external pressure"; 
13 and 
(22) the index of ethnic tensions, which inversely measures the degree of latent social conflict in 
a country on the lines of race, language and geographical location.  
The Database of Political Institutions records and tracks 123 attributes of the political 
systems for 178 countries during the years 1975-2006.
14 We include three variables from the DPI 
that appear to be measures of institutional quality: (23) the legislative index of electoral 
competitiveness, which measures the extent to which the multiple parties are able to compete for 
seats; (24) the executive index of electoral competitiveness, which assesses the extent to which 
the selection of the chief executive is made by the people; and (25) checks, which counts the 
number of veto points, or governmental checks that exist within the government. In addition, we 
include two variables that appear to capture institutional stability: (26) political fractionalization, 
which is the probability that two members of the legislature will be from different parties; and 
(27) political polarization, which takes the values zero, one, or two, and measures the maximum 
distance between the executive's party and the four main parties in the legislature on the ‘Left-
Center-Right’ scale.  
As a practical concern, it is difficult to account for multiple dimensions of institutional 
quality in the same empirical model due to the fact that the institutional variables tend to be 
highly correlated (see Table 2). Thus, Section 3 begins our analysis by introducing each element 
of institutional quality and stability into our empirical model separately to get a preliminary 
picture of the extent to which these institutional characteristics differ in determining the 
education of immigrants. Once we have some idea of the importance of the individual variables, 
                                                 
13 Alternative measures of external conflict include the ones provided by the Political Instability Taskforce (PITF) 
and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). For the most part, existing datasets on external conflict focus on 
civil wars exclusively. We have used the ICRG measure because it captures different forms of external conflict. 
14 See Beck et al. (2001) for a description of the methodology behind the DPI variable construction.     15
we perform a factor analysis to isolate the four key dimensions of institutions in Section 4, and 
test their impacts on the educational attainment of immigrants in Section 5.  
3. A Preliminary Exploration of the Data 
As is clear from the correlation matrix presented in Table 2, the individual components of 
institutional structure are highly correlated with each other. Hence, we include the components 
individually in our second stage regression equation. The results of this preliminary investigation 
are presented in Table 3. Consistent with our first hypothesis, Table 3 shows that internal 
conflict, external conflict, and ethnic tension in the country of origin increase the skill intensity 
of immigrants, all three variables being significant at the 1% level. The durability of a regime is 
seen to have a significant positive impact on skill intensity at the 1% level. At first sight, this 
variable would appear to relate to the stability dimension of institutional structure, and therefore 
be expected to have a negative impact on the selection of immigrants. However, a regime may be 
durable precisely because it ensures the security of property rights; provides necessary public 
goods and services; and thereby allows no scope for the formation of grievance that would lead 
to regime change.
15 Hence, regime durability may, in fact, relate more to the quality dimension 
of institutional structure than the stability dimension. As we will discuss in the next section, the 
factor analysis reported in Table 4 confirms this argument by grouping regime durability with the 
ICRG corruption and bureaucratic quality indices as a measure of transparency.  
Reinforcing this argument, the government stability index is also seen to have a positive 
impact on skill intensity at the 1% level of significance. As with durability, this index would a 
priori appear to be an indicator of stability and have a negative predicted sign. Note, however, 
                                                 
15 Alternatively, if one believes political instability to be motivated more by greed than grievance, a high quality of 
governance reduces the incentive for predatory behavior. See the influential study by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) on 
the primacy of greed as the dominant motive for conflict as opposed to grievance.    16
that the index measures the ability of a government to implement declared policies, based on the 
level of popular approval; the extent of unity within the government; and its strength in the 
legislature. In light of this definition, it may be more accurate to think of it as capturing the 
government's credibility. Since credibility depends to a great extent on its ability to ensure a high 
institutional quality, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the government stability index relates 
more to the quality dimension of institutional structure than the stability dimension. As before, 
the factor analysis reported in Table 4 validates this argument. The government stability index 
combines more with the investment profile index, which measures the credibility of a 
government in terms of its ability to provide an environment favorable to private and especially, 
foreign direct investment.  
Of the two measures of fragmentation within the government, the index of political 
polarization is positively significant at the 1% level, while the political fractionalization index 
turns out to be insignificant at any level. The polarization index captures the presence of 
ideological differences within the incumbent government. Since differences in political ideology 
may potentially lead to instability, the positive sign on this variable is exactly what intuition 
would lead us to expect. The insignificance of the fractionalization index is not particularly 
problematic. The fractionalization index uses information on the difference in party affiliations 
within the ruling government to capture the degree to which a country is governed by a coalition 
of small parties. Insofar as coalitions are expected to be less stable than single party governments, 
greater fractionalization in the elected legislature may be expected to contribute to greater 
instability and hence, improve the selection of immigrants. However, mere differences in party 
affiliation are a far coarser measure of potential instability than more serious differences in 
ideology that underlie the polarization index. As such, it is hardly surprising that the latter turns 
out to have a stronger impact on skill intensity.    17
Interestingly, the only apparent measure of institutional quality that appears to be 
significant in Table 3 is the investment profile index, which is seen to have a positive impact on 
skill intensity at the 1% level. Recall that this index captures the ability of the government to 
provide a favorable environment for private enterprise and so it reflects the quality of institutions 
that affect domestic investment and FDI. As such, our second hypothesis would lead us to expect 
a positive impact of this variable on the selection of migrants. This is consistent with existing 
evidence, which reports a dynamic complementarity between FDI and skilled migration. As 
argued by Kugler and Rapoport (2007), Docquier and Lodigiani (2008), or Beine, et al. (2010), 
not only do skilled migrants act as a source of information for investment opportunities in their 
countries of origin, they also help develop trade networks between their home and host countries. 
Lastly, the statistical insignificance of the other indicators of institutional quality could 
simply be due to the fact that including the variables individually in the regression equation 
introduces an omitted variable bias in our estimates. In fact, once we account for this by 
including principal factors of the institutional variables, we see a quite different picture emerging. 
4. Multi-Dimensionality of Institutional Structure 
In view of the conceptual and statistical problems associated with measuring the impact 
of institutional variables individually on the education of immigrants, it may help to get a more 
general sense of the overall impact of institutional structure. Following Alesina et al. (1996), 
Perotti (1996), Knack and Keefer (1995), Jong-a-Pin (2009), and others, we therefore try to 
identify combinations of variables that explain some aspect of institutions and can be interpreted 
more broadly than a single institutional variable.  
One simple method for doing this would be to perform a principle component analysis on 
the institutional variables described in section 4, and interpret the first component as institutions.   18
This is the essence of what Alesina and Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), and Keefer and Knack 
(1997) do in the context of investigating the influence of institutional quality on economic 
growth. 
16 Alternatively, following Alesina et al. (1996), one could construct a unidimensional 
index of institutional quality by using logit analysis. However, it is well documented that 
institutions have multiple dimensions (Jong-A-Pin [2009]), and it is our hypothesis that these 
dimensions of institutional quality and stability have different impacts on immigrant selection. 
Hence, a unidimensional index would fail to capture the true impact of institutional structure.  
This raises the question as to why we do not construct two such indices for institutional 
quality and stability respectively. The problem is that this would require a prior classification of 
available variables into ones that capture stability and ones that stand for quality. Having 
undertaken such a task in our preliminary exploration of the data, we are convinced that many of 
the available variables are not perfect measures of one dimension of institutional character as 
opposed to another.  
An alternative to principle component analysis, and one that is used by Jong-a-Pin (2009) 
in the context of the relationship between political stability and economic growth, is factor 
analysis. Factor analysis is related to principle component analysis, but while principle 
component analysis aims to extract the maximum source of variation in the variables possible, 
factor analysis only seeks to capture the common sources of variation among the variables. Also, 
whereas in principle component analysis the components are linear combinations of the observed 
variables, in factor analysis the observed variables are actually linear combinations of the 
constructed underlying factors. These features allow us to interpret the predicted factors and 
attach theoretical meaning to them. Principle components do not lead to any such interpretation 
                                                 
16 The first two papers investigate the impact of income inequality on economic growth via its role in fomenting 
social discontent. As such, they focus on constructing indices of sociopolitical instability rather than general 
institutional structure. Keefer and Knack (1997), on the other hand, consider more general measures of institutions.   19
in the sense that they do not capture any underlying commonalities between the variables as 
factor analysis does. As a result, factor analysis proves more useful in our investigation. 
The factor loadings from our factor analysis of the fifteen institutional variables described 
in section 4 are reported in Table 4. These loadings come from a maximum likelihood 
exploratory factor analysis using an oblimin rotation method.
17 From these results, we are able to 
interpret four important common factors underlying the observed institutional variables: 
Democracy, security, transparency, and credibility. To help see where these interpretations come 
from, we have highlighted cells represent variables whose loading weight for that factor is 
greater than 0.5.  
For the democracy factor, the variables that carry factor loadings greater than 0.5 are: the 
executive index of electoral competitiveness (0.8801); the legislative index of electoral 
competitiveness, (0.8703); political fractionalization, (0.8453); the polity index, (0.8371); 
democratic accountability (0.7037); and political polarization (0.5869). With the exception of 
polarization, each of these is a measure of the extent to which a country's political leaders are 
determined by free and fair elections as opposed to being determined by dictate. In the case of 
polarization, countries that have divided governments (in which the executive and the legislature 
are from separate sides of the political spectrum) are less likely to be autocratic (or, countries 
that are autocratic are extremely likely to not be divided).  
For security, the variables with factor loadings greater than 0.5 are: internal conflict 
(0.7809); ethnic tensions (0.6765); and external conflict (0.6122). Of these, internal conflict and 
ethnic tensions are likely to be the most correlated with the internal stability of the institutions of 
                                                 
17 We also constrained the model to return a maximum of four common factors. When we relaxed this assumption, 
the number of factors returned by the model was seven, the first four of which had a similar interpretation as 
described here, and the last three of which did not have any single variable that stood out with a factor loading 
greater than 0.3.    20
a country, since they capture the effects of conflict and tensions occurring within a country's 
borders. In the case of external conflict, countries might be engaged in external conflict for a 
wide variety of reasons. For example, during our sample period the United States was involved 
with conflicts in Bosnia, Kuwait, and Somalia, although this did not seem to have a substantial 
impact on the quality or stability of the United States' institutions. 
The variables with high weights in the transparency factor are: bureaucratic quality 
(0.6069); corruption (0.5696); and regime durability (0.5204). The first two are clearly related to 
the transparency and efficiency of the government and its bureaucracy, and these variables factor 
somewhat highly into the construction of the democracy and security factors as well. While 
playing less of a role, political durability may be regarded a reflection of the institutional 
transparency of a country in the sense that the duration of the government is a function of its 
perceived legitimacy, which in turn is directly impacted by the absence of corruption and waste.  
Finally,  credibility is determined by: government stability (0.6696) and investment 
profile (0.6379). The investment profile index relates to government credibility in terms of 
enforcing contracts and protecting private property rights. The government stability index shows 
how credible the announced policies are expected to be, and how secure those policies are 
against radical shifts within the government. Together, they combine to proxy for the overall 
credibility of the government.  
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for these principle factor variables, and Table 6 
gives an idea of how countries in our sample rank with respect to the four institutional principal 
components. Note that Israel, for example, ranks second with respect to the extent of democracy, 
but comes in at number 56 with respect to the security of property rights, and not surprisingly 
given the experience of political turmoil in that part of the world, at number 111 out of 114 with 
respect to political stability. All this points to the validity of distinguishing between multiple   21
dimensions of institutional character and provides at least preliminary justification for our 
hypothesis that these dimensions may differ in their impact on the educational attainment of 
immigrants. Lastly, a critical advantage of using factor analysis is that the resulting factors are 
relatively uncorrelated with one another.
18 This will allow us to include all of the components in 
the same specification of the model and reduce the possibility for omitted variable bias. The 
results from this specification of our empirical model are reported in the next section.  
5. Results and Robustness 
Results 
Our final analysis again implements a two stage procedure, where we first instrument for 
per capita GDP by per capita energy consumption in the source countries, and subsequently 
estimate a fixed effects model with the principal factors obtained in Section 4 as our explanatory 
variables. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 7. The principal factor reflecting the 
security of civil society is seen to have a significantly negative impact on the skill intensity of 
immigrants. To see why the coefficient on the security factor is negative, recall that this factor 
reflects the absence of external conflict, internal conflict, and ethnic tension in the country of 
origin. As hypothesized, an increase in sociopolitical stability would reduce the incentive for 
skilled migration; and this is precisely what we observe. On the average, a one standard 
deviation increase in the security factor is seen to reduce the fraction of highly skilled 
immigrants by a factor of approximately 0.02. 
Also in line with our hypothesis, an increase in the transparency of government 
operations is seen to have a positive and significant impact on the skill intensity of immigrants. 
Recall that a high value of the transparency factor reflects a high level of bureaucratic quality, a 
                                                 
18 Principle component analysis actually forces the resulting components to be completely orthogonal, and explain 
100% of the variation in the observed variables. With common factor analysis the factors are typically not 
completely orthogonal, but the correlation between them is usually low, as is the case with the factors we construct.    22
low level of corruption, and a greater perception of legitimacy of the government by virtue of its 
ability to deliver public services. In other words, a high value of the transparency factor reflects a 
high quality of existing institutions. As per our hypothesis, this should predict a higher skill 
intensity of immigrants, since workers at the upper tail of the indigenous skill distribution would 
have a greater incentive to migrate relative to workers at the lower tail, which is precisely what 
we observe. A one standard deviation increase in transparency is seen to increase the fraction of 
highly skilled immigrants by a factor of 0.011 approximately.  
The second factor reflecting institutional quality is the credibility of the government, as 
determined by its ability to prevent delays in payments receivable; ensure a low level of 
expropriation risk; and equally importantly, ensure the continuity of government policies, 
particularly towards private investment and FDI. A high value of the credibility factor, therefore, 
reflects a more favorable political climate for private enterprise and may thus be expected to 
correlate with a high average return to skill investment.
19 Hence, if a worker has an incentive to 
migrate, it is more likely that he or she is from the upper tail of the indigenous skill distribution. 
As such, we would expect the credibility factor to have a positive impact on the skill intensity of 
immigrants; and this is exactly what we observe in Table 7: A one standard deviation increase in 
the credibility factor increases the fraction of skilled immigrants by a factor of 0.012. While the 
credibility factor does appear to have a marginally stronger impact on skill intensity than 
transparency, none of the two factors relating to quality appear to compare with the security 
factor in its impact on skill intensity. This raises the question as to whether the stability 
dimension of institutional character is more important in determining the magnitude of brain 
drain than the quality dimension. 
                                                 
19 This, of course, is in addition to the dynamic complementarity between FDI and skilled migration, mentioned in 
Section 3.   23
Interestingly, the democracy factor turns out to be insignificant at any acceptable level. 
Democratic governments are typically less repressive and more responsive to popular concerns. 
As such, they may be regarded as creating lower incentives for the construction of grievance, 
which may act as a key motive for skilled migration (Docquier and Rapoport [2003]). At first 
sight, therefore, the level of democracy may be expected to have a negative impact on the 
incentive to migrate. On the other hand, if the existence of democracy is taken to correlate with a 
higher quality of institutions, we may expect a positive impact on the selection of migrants for 
reasons explained earlier. Theoretically, therefore, it is not clear what the sign on this factor 
should be. In fact, the vast empirical literature that seeks to assess the economic consequences of 
democracy has typically failed to establish a robust impact of democracy on economic outcomes, 
notably growth (Feng [2003]). In fact, scholarly opinion on the topic remains divided; and the 
only consensus that seems to be emerging is that it is not the character of a regime as a 
democracy or autocracy but the quality of public institutions and policies associated with it that 
have a perceptible impact on economic outcomes.
20 For example, two democracies may differ 
significantly in economic performance if one closes itself to international trade and FDI and the 
other does not. In addition, the extent of democratization may itself depend on other factors, such 
as the level of ethnic diversity in an economy (Akdede [2010]).  
Robustness 
This subsection reports a number of robustness checks performed on our results. First, it 
is clear from Table 6 that our results are not sensitive to whether we include all four dimensions 
of institutional quality or introduce them individually. It is also noteworthy that the results are 
not just robust in terms of significance, but that the magnitudes are also nearly identical.  
                                                 
20 There are, of course, exceptions: Jamali, et al. (2007), for example, find that democracies significantly outperform 
other types of regimes.    24
We have earlier defended our decision to instrument for per capita GDP in the countries 
of origin. It may however be asked if this procedure affects our results to any degree. To address 
this issue, we include per capita GDP directly as a control variable in our fixed effects model. 
While the results of this exercise are not included in the paper, the security factor remains 
negatively significant at the 1% level; the credibility factor retains its positive impact at the 1% 
level; and democracy remains insignificant at any level. The only difference is in the significance 
of the transparency factor, which now has a positive impact at the 5% level instead of at the 1% 
level. We obtain the same results when per capita GDP is included directly as a control variable. 
  It is also natural to inquire if our results are sensitive to aggregation in the way we 
construct the skill intensity variable. To address this question, we run an ordered logit model in 
the second stage of our estimation, retaining the first stage instrumentation of per capita GDP. 
We have already described the procedure followed in assigning immigrants to occupational skill 
tertiles in Section 4. Now, instead of aggregating by country-year the individual occupational 
skill tertiles are used as the dependent variable in the second stage ordered logit regression. As 
reported in Table 8, the security factor remains negatively significant at the 1% level. The 
marginal effect reported in the last column shows that a unit increase in the value of this variable 
scales down the probability that a randomly selected migrant belongs to the highest skill tertile 
by a factor of 0.02 approximately. Also, the credibility and transparency factors retain positive 
significance at the 1% level. A unit increase in the transparency of governance increases the 
probability of a random immigrant belonging to the highest skill tertile by a factor of about 0.026 
and the marginal effect of the credibility factor is about 0.025.  
Interestingly, however, the democracy factor turns out to have a significant positive 
impact at the 1% level. In fact, a unit increase in the democracy factor is seen to scale up the 
probability of a random immigrant belonging to the highest skill tertile by 0.065 approximately.   25
Note that this does not say that the sheer existence of democracy in a country plays an important 
role in the selection of immigrants. Given the composition of the democracy factor, it appears to 
be the quality of public institutions more likely to be associated with a democratic regime than an 
autocratic one that plays a role in determining the occupational skill endowment of immigrants. 
Also, the largeness of the sample size in this estimation relative to the country-averaged panel 
might play a role in augmenting the impact of this variable.  
  Lastly, as an alternative to the fixed effect model employed in our analysis, we 
implement a feasible generalized least square model (FGLS) with skill intensity as dependent 
variable. While the results of this exercise are not included in the paper, it appears to confirm our 
general findings, both when we instrument for GDP and when we do not: Security, credibility, 
and transparency retain their respective impacts at the 1% level, while democracy stays 
insignificant at any acceptable level of significance. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the role of institutions in determining the magnitude of brain 
drain. Specifically, it explores the hypothesis that institutions have multiple dimensions and the 
different aspects of institutional structure may have conflicting impacts on the migration of 
skilled labor. Using an exploratory factor analysis on fifteen institutional variables commonly 
used in the literature, we are able to identify the following aspects of institutional character: (1) 
credibility of the government; (2) transparency of government operations; (3) democracy; and (4) 
the security of civil society. Of these, the first three pertain to the quality of existing institutions, 
while the last pertains to stability. In line with our hypothesis, high institutional quality, as 
captured by the credibility and transparency of government, is seen to increase the magnitude of   26
brain drain, while high stability was seen to reduce it. Interestingly, democracy is not seen to 
have a robust impact on the migration of skilled labor.  
We conjecture that the quality and stability dimensions of institutional character have 
conflicting impacts on the magnitude of brain drain because they influence the incentive to 
migrate differently. Political stability reduces the expected domestic returns to human capital 
investment. Having made this investment, therefore, individuals have less incentive to migrate 
from a country with a stable political environment than one experiencing political turmoil. Hence, 
greater stability reduces the magnitude of brain drain. By contrast, higher institutional quality in 
a country provides high skilled workers with a greater incentive to migrate than the low skilled. 
Hence, higher institutional quality in the country of origin increases the magnitude of brain drain.  
In addressing the multidimensionality of institutional structure, this paper provides a 
more nuanced analysis of the institutional determinants of brain drain. Further, our results have 
an interesting policy implication: Institutional reform and investment in educational 
infrastructure are viewed as necessary preconditions for sustained economic growth. If a small 
developing economy fails to take these steps, it is unlikely that it will be able to grow. If, 
however, it pursues needed liberalization programs; improves the quality of governance; and 
increases access to education; it risks losing its investment to migration. If brain drain is 
detrimental to growth, this confronts a developing economy with a policy conundrum. However, 
recent research on brain drain suggests that it is not necessarily detrimental in the long run since 
highly skilled diasporas provide greater incentives for skill investment in the country of origin; 
send remittances; create networks that stimulate trade and inflows of FDI; and may even act as 
agents for needed institutional reform. If this is indeed the case, then liberalization programs 
should be pursued without regard to their impact on emigration decisions.    27
Lastly, while this paper contributes towards a better understanding of the causes of brain 
drain, much remains unresolved on the topic, even with respect to the role of institutions. An 
immediate question in this regard is whether the different dimensions of institutional structure 
have similar impacts on the migration of male and female labor? The question is particularly 
important in light of recent findings by Docquier, et al. (2009) that the emigration rate of skilled 
women tends to be higher on the average than that of skilled men. A second set of questions 
relate specifically to the stability dimension: There is reason to believe that political instability 
may itself be multidimensional (Jong-A-Pin [2009]). In this case, it may well be asked if 
different forms of instability differ in their impacts on the skilled migration. Specifically, does 
ethnic conflict differ in its consequences on brain drain than other forms of conflict? There is an 
emerging literature in political science which finds that ethnic conflict tends to last longer; is 
more resistant to third party intervention; and exhibits a greater intensity of violence than other 
forms of conflict (Eck [2009]). As such, it may well differ in its impact on migration than other 
forms of conflict. These and other questions will be important areas for exploration in 
subsequent research on institutions and the migration of skilled labor.    28
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Tables 






Skill Intensity INS 0.678 0.175 0.115 0.937
Controls
Year INS 1993.210 3.072 1988 1998
Number of Immigrants (1,000) INS 2.297 4.587 0.100 40.740
New Immigrant INS 0.570 0.191 0.083 0.967
Employment Visas INS 0.190 0.171 0.000 0.713
Population (1,000,000) WDI 45.200 115.000 0.673 982.000
GDP per Capita ($1,000)  WDI 7.513 9.047 0.103 36.792
Average Education in 1960 Barro & Lee 3.859 2.518 0.210 9.560
Average Education  Barro & Lee 6.237 2.637 1.150 11.820
Distance (1,000 km) CEPII 8.008 3.702 0.548 16.180
English CEPII 0.529 0.500 0 1
Colony CEPII 0.047 0.211 0 1
Institutional Stability
Government Stability ICRG 6.765 2.051 1 12
Internal Conflict ICRG 8.924 2.985 0 12
External Conflict ICRG 10.342 2.067 2 12
Ethnic Tensions ICRG 4.256 1.572 0 6
Political Durability Polity IV 26.210 30.697 0 150
Political Fractionalization DPI 0.568 0.263 0 1
Political Polarization DPI 0.735 0.872 0 2
Institutional Quality
Corruption ICRG 3.674 1.379 0 6
Bureaucratic Quality ICRG 2.431 1.229 0 4
Investment Profile ICRG 6.109 1.781 1 11
Democratic Accountability ICRG 4.096 1.424 0 6
Polity Polity IV 5.101 5.969 -10 10
Executive Electoral Competition DPI 6.274 1.612 1 7
Legislative Electoral Competition DPI 6.495 1.316 1 7
Government Checks DPI 3.417 2.010 1 18
Fixed Effects
Asia INS 0.261 0.439 0 1
Europe INS 0.278 0.448 0 1
Africa INS 0.126 0.332 0 1
Oceania INS 0.031 0.174 0 1
South America INS 0.148 0.355 0 1
North America & Carribean INS 0.156 0.363 0 1   32







































Employ. Visa 0.355 -0.292
Number -0.311 0.224 -0.078
GDP per Cap. 0.367 -0.087 0.242 -0.081
Ave. Educ.  0.330 0.051 0.262 0.061 0.736
Gov. Stability 0.217 -0.006 0.237 -0.068 0.289 0.305
Int. Conflict 0.302 -0.085 0.299 -0.003 0.524 0.598 0.481
Ext. Conflict 0.170 -0.032 0.362 0.101 0.384 0.489 0.365 0.674
Ethnic Tension 0.038 0.037 0.155 0.021 0.443 0.488 0.382 0.697 0.548
Pol. Durability 0.283 -0.046 0.129 -0.088 0.665 0.535 0.211 0.320 0.179 0.225
Pol. Frac.  0.030 0.192 0.181 0.085 0.343 0.459 0.218 0.349 0.365 0.287 0.187
Pol. Polariz. 0.128 0.030 0.187 -0.070 0.456 0.430 0.177 0.308 0.342 0.259 0.213 0.563
Corrupt 0.327 -0.092 0.243 -0.048 0.671 0.677 0.328 0.609 0.459 0.512 0.499 0.327 0.366
Bur. Quality 0.435 -0.060 0.295 -0.042 0.708 0.659 0.371 0.591 0.418 0.403 0.530 0.349 0.365 0.762
Inv. Profile 0.185 0.076 0.148 -0.033 0.367 0.388 0.706 0.477 0.372 0.365 0.265 0.241 0.260 0.373 0.457
Dem. Acct.  0.267 -0.009 0.232 0.039 0.649 0.677 0.336 0.629 0.546 0.475 0.514 0.501 0.489 0.717 0.705 0.445
Polity 0.024 0.115 0.202 0.109 0.466 0.585 0.139 0.422 0.457 0.410 0.297 0.638 0.515 0.491 0.443 0.302 0.681
Ex. El. Comp.  -0.009 0.146 0.173 0.158 0.291 0.418 0.205 0.369 0.375 0.320 0.208 0.702 0.408 0.346 0.352 0.319 0.545 0.706
Leg. El. Comp. 0.024 0.211 0.153 0.132 0.253 0.406 0.255 0.412 0.391 0.338 0.210 0.734 0.375 0.322 0.314 0.322 0.502 0.609 0.836
Gov. Checks 0.155 0.095 0.191 0.074 0.344 0.361 0.142 0.350 0.335 0.229 0.211 0.637 0.576 0.318 0.399 0.220 0.524 0.582 0.585 0.519
Highlighted cells indicate a correlation greater than 0.3. 





















































‡ -0.0103 -2.30 -0.0097 -2.25
†
Average Education -0.0038 -0.77 -0.0040 -0.77 -0.0057 -1.20 -0.0017 -0.33 -0.0022 -0.43 -0.0054 -1.09 -0.0052 -1.06
















Gov. Stability 0.0035 2.49
†
Internal Conflict -0.0050 -3.11
‡
External Conflict -0.0075 -5.08
‡
Ethnic Tensions -0.0091 -3.50
‡
Political Durability 0.0008 2.83
‡
Pol. Fractionalization -0.0053 -0.44










Observations 659 659 659 659 659 659 659
u 0.1893 0.2089 0.2153 0.1995 0.1957 0.1960 0.1901
e 0.0457 0.0457 0.0452 0.0457 0.0460 0.0460 0.0458
 0.9450 0.9543 0.9578 0.9501 0.9476 0.9478 0.9451
Two-stage least squares with energy consumption as an instrument for GDP per capita. First stage results available on request. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; 
† Significant at the 0.05 level; 
‡ Significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 3: Impacts of individual institutional stability variables on the average skill of immigrants to the US with country fixed effects. (Dependent 
Variable: Skill intensity) 































































Average Education -0.0050 -0.98 -0.0055 -1.13 -0.0041 -0.84 -0.0056 -1.14 -0.0048 -0.96 -0.0051 -1.04 -0.0051 -1.03 -0.0053 -1.07



















Bur. Quality -0.0004 -0.08
Inv. Profile 0.0041 3.06
‡
Dem. Account. -0.0010 -0.39
Polity -0.0015 -1.18
Ex. Elec. Comp. -0.0024 -0.93
Leg. Elec. Comp. -0.0014 -0.53










Observations 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659
u 0.1985 0.1846 0.1935 0.1927 0.2024 0.2011 0.1972 0.1913
e 0.0459 0.0456 0.0459 0.0459 0.0460 0.0460 0.0460 0.0459
 0.9491 0.9424 0.9466 0.9462 0.9508 0.9502 0.9484 0.9456
Two-stage least squares with energy consumption as an instrument for GDP per capita. First stage results available on request. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; 
† Significant at the 0.05 level; 
‡ Significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4: Rotated Factor Loadings for Institutional Variables
Variable Democracy Security Transparency Credibility Uniqueness
Government Stability 0.1536 0.316 0.0059 0.6696 0.4281
Investment Profile 0.2723 0.3056 0.1806 0.6379 0.393
Internal Conflict 0.2895 0.7809 0.188 0.1823 0.2378
External Conflict 0.3867 0.6122 0.0466 0.048 0.4712
Corruption 0.4012 0.3936 0.5696 -0.0351 0.3585
Ethnic Tensions 0.2556 0.6765 0.0885 0.1239 0.4539
Bureaucratic Quality 0.397 0.3553 0.6069 0.168 0.3196
Democratic Accountability 0.7037 0.2735 0.4363 0.0437 0.2377
Polity 0.8371 0.1232 0.1539 -0.0699 0.2556
Political Durability 0.1144 0.1595 0.5204 0.0956 0.6815
Legislative Electoral Competition 0.8703 0.0469 -0.1161 0.0742 0.2215
Executive Electoral Competition 0.8801 0.0451 -0.0506 0.0326 0.2197
Political Fractionalization 0.8453 0.0201 -0.0283 0.0635 0.2803
Political Polarization 0.5869 0.075 0.2421 0.0235 0.5907
Government Checks 0.087 0.0785 -0.0533 -0.0142 0.9832
Highlighted cells represent variables with a factor loadings greater than 0.5 (in absolute value). These 
variables are used to interpret what each factor represents. Principle factor method has been used to 
calculate the factor loadings, and the rotation method is oblimin.     36
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Institutional Principle Factor
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Democracy 5.56E-10 0.962 -2.057 1.201
Security -2.45E-10 0.859 -3.225 1.629
Transparency -4.21E-10 0.830 -2.559 2.423
Credibility 5.45E-10 0.780 -2.251 2.031  
 
 
Table 6: Selected Rankings of Countries by Institutional Principle Factor
Democracy Security Transparency Property Rights
Top Five
1 Belgium Singapore United States Morocco
2 Israel Hungary Switzerland Saudi Arabia
3 Denmark Finland Canada Singapore
4 Netherlands Denmark New Zealand Taiwan
5 Norway Oman Sweden Qatar
First Quartile
29 Australia Australia Saudi Arabia South Africa
30 United States Syria India Senegal
Middle Five
56 Mexico Namibia Burkina Faso Israel
57 Romania Brazil Nigeria Malawi
58 Bulgaria Congo Botswana Sri Lanka
59 Guyana Malawi Colombia Finland
60 Namibia Iran Serbia & MontenegroSlovakia
Third Quartile
85 Indonesia Cyprus Indonesia Argentina
86 Ghana Indonesia Malawi Colombia
Bottom Five
110 UAE Congo, DR Bangladesh Romania
111 Oman Israel Mali Sierra Leone
112 Bahrain Iraq Panama Nicaragua
113 Saudi Arabia Sudan Haiti Liberia
















































Average Education ###### -1.06 -0.0026 -0.51 ###### -0.75 ###### -0.49 0.0020 0.39
























‡ ###### -1.57 ###### -2.78
‡
Observations 659 659 659 659 659
u 0.1996 0.2046 0.1959 0.1868 0.2074
e 0.0460 0.0452 0.0459 0.0454 0.0449
 0.9495 0.9534 0.9479 0.9444 0.9553
* Significant at the 0.10 level; 
† Significant at the 0.05 level; 
‡ Significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 6: Impacts of institutional principle factors on the average skill of immigrants to the US 
with country fixed effects. (Dependent Variable: Skill intensity) 
Two-stage least squares with energy consumption as an instrument for GDP per capita. First stage 
results available on request. 



























Year -0.0070 -6.05 -0.0017
‡ 0.0129 10.33 0.0032
‡ -0.0014 -1.20 -0.0003 -0.0093 -7.44 -0.0023
‡ -0.0098 -6.92 -0.0024
‡
New Immigrant -0.0028 -0.43 -0.0007 0.0168 2.58 0.0042
† 0.0134 2.04 0.0033
† 0.0095 1.46 0.0024 -0.0060 -0.91 -0.0015
Employment Visas 1.3628 ##### 0.3239
‡ 1.3870 ##### 0.3290
‡ 1.3755 ##### 0.3265
‡ 1.3869 ##### 0.3289
‡ 1.3744 ##### 0.3264
‡
GDP per Capita 0.0137 25.60 0.0034
‡ 0.0232 42.35 0.0058
‡ 0.0160 27.42 0.0040
‡ 0.0178 35.16 0.0000
‡ 0.0132 19.54 0.0033
‡
Average Education  -0.0899 -25.61 -0.0223
‡ -0.0294 -8.51 -0.0073
‡ -0.0455 -13.12 -0.0113
‡ -0.0528 -16.09 -0.0131
‡ -0.0498 -12.75 -0.0124
‡
Ave. Educ. in 1960 -0.0138 -3.36 -0.0034
‡ -0.0230 -5.31 -0.0057
‡ 0.0033 0.78 0.0008 0.0164 4.07 0.0041
‡ -0.0447 -9.89 -0.0111
‡
Num of Immigrants -0.0141 -19.96 -0.0035
‡ -0.0056 -7.81 -0.0014
‡ -0.0105 -15.08 -0.0026
‡ -0.0074 -9.97 0.0000
‡ -0.0059 -7.42 -0.0015
‡
Population 0.0003 12.49 0.0001
‡ 0.0005 27.51 0.0001
‡ 0.0006 33.93 0.0001
‡ 0.0007 36.67 0.0000
‡ 0.0003 12.52 0.0001
‡
Distance 0.0281 9.11 0.0070
‡ 0.0322 10.41 0.0080
‡ 0.0405 12.37 0.0101
‡ 0.0273 8.70 0.0000
‡ 0.0373 11.45 0.0093
‡
English -0.0780 -9.88 -0.0194
‡ -0.0328 -4.26 -0.0081
‡ -0.0136 -1.72 -0.0034
* -0.0303 -3.85 -0.0075
‡ -0.1659 -18.87 -0.0412
‡
Colony 0.2132 11.45 0.0532
‡ 0.3043 16.74 0.0759
‡ 0.3531 19.69 0.0881
‡ 0.3409 18.96 0.0850
‡ 0.1996 10.67 0.0498
‡
Democracy 0.3178 32.02 0.0789
‡ 0.2642 25.87 0.0656
‡
Security -0.1245 -23.87 -0.0309
‡ -0.0791 -14.89 -0.0196
‡
Transparency 0.0596 8.15 0.0148
‡ 0.1060 14.09 0.0263
‡
Credibility 0.1020 19.20 0.0253
‡ 0.1009 18.56 0.0251
‡
Cut 1 -14.994 0.00 25.071 0.00 -3.340 0.00 -19.331 0.00 -20.538 0.00
Cut 2 -13.646 0.00 26.418 0.00 -1.994 0.00 -17.985 0.00 -19.189 0.00
Observations 518,015 518,016 518,017 518,018 518,019
Adjusted R
2 0.0574 0.0569 0.0565 0.0567 0.0581
* Significant at the 0.10 level; 
† Significant at the 0.05 level; 
‡ Significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 7: Impacts of institutional principle factors on the skill of immigrants to the US. (Ordered Logit, Dependent Variable: Immigrant Skill) 
Two-stage least squares with energy consumption as an instrument for GDP per capita. First stage results available on request. 
Marginal Effects represent the change in the probability of being an immigrant from a "highly-skilled" occupation for a given change in x.
 